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United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972)
In United States v. United States District Court'
and Gelbard v. United States,2 the Supreme Court
construed Sections 2511(3), 2515, and 2518(10)(a)
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act. Taken together, the cases in-
dicate a Supreme Court policy favoring complete
disclosure of information obtained by illegal eaves-
dropping as the only effective protection against
illegal surveillance. The cases extend a policy of
disclosure set out in Alderman v. United States
4
where the Supreme Court put the government
to the choice of dismissing its case or of disclosing
to the defendant all information obtained through
illegal eavesdropping. In Alderman, the Court
held that the defendant is entitled to examine all
government records pertaining to his own con-
versations, so that he can determine to what extent
the eavesdropping contributed to the government's
case.5 He is then entitled to a hearing and an 6p-
407 U.S. 297 (1972).2408 U.S. 41 (1972).
3 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520 (1968). The Omnibus Crime
Control an'd Safe Streets Act authorizes the use of elec-
tronic surveillance for the specified classes of crimes as
set out in §2516. All such surveillance is subject to prior
court order. The standards and procedures for the war-
rant application arc set out in §2518. It is required that
the application be in writing and under oath and that
it state fully the facts and circumstances relied upon by
the affirming officer in support of the application. It
must also state the period of time during which the sur-
veillance will be maintained. In addition, the affirming
officer must indicate whether other investigative pro-
cedures have been tried and failed or why they reasona-
bly appear unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous.
Title III is a comprehensive congressional attempt
to meet the Constitutional requirements for electronic
surveillance set forth by the Supreme Court in Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4 394 U.S. 165 (1968).
5 Id. at 181. In Alderman, the Court rejected the al-
ternative of an in camera examination by the trial court
to identify those records which might have contributed
to the government's case in favor of allowing the de-
fendant to interpret and evaluate the records.
[Wlinnowing [the irrelevant] material from those
items which might have made a substantial con-
tribution to the case against the petitioner is a task
which should not be entrusted wholl3 to thc court.
... An apparently innocent phrase, a chance re-
mark, a reference to what appears to be a neutral
person or event... may have special significar-'
to one who knows the more intimate facts of the
accused's life. And yet that information may be
portunity to argue for suppression of the evidence
tainted by the illegal surveillance.6
In United States v. United States District Court
the Court denied the power of the President, acting
through the Attorney General, to authorize elec-
tronic surveillance in domestic security matters
without prior judicial approval Without a war-
rant, such surveillance is illegal, and the govern-
ment must face the choice offered by Alderman
of either dismissing the case against the defendant,
or turning over to the defendant the records of
his intercepted conversations8
The District Court case arose from a criminal
proceeding in which three defendants were indicted
by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to destroy
government property. One of the three, Plamon-
don, was also charged with destruction of govern-
ment property. In a pre-trial motion, the
defendants sought the disclosure of their conversa-
tions allegedly intercepted by illegal eavesdrop-
ping. The government responded by filing Attor-
ney General John Mitchell's affidavit to the effect
that he had authorized the wiretaps for domestic
security purposes.' The government also filed a
wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to one less
well acquainted with all relevant circumstances.
Unavoidably, this is a matter of judgment, but
... the task is too complex... to rely wholly on
the in camera judgment of the trial court.
Id. at 182.
6Id. at 183.
7 The Supreme Court left open the question of the
constitutionality of warrantless domestic security wire-
taps in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967):
Whether safeguards other than prior authorization
by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amend-
ment in a situation involving the national security
is a question not presented by this case.
Id. at 358 n.23.
Only the question of domestic security surveillance is
involved in United States v. United States District Court.
The Attorney General's affidavit makes no mention
of any foreign activities or agents; it deals only
with activities of a domestic organization. The Court
clearly holds that they do not reach the question of the
President's power to deal with foreign adversaries or
their agents. 407 U.S. at 309 n.8.
8 407 U.S. at 324.
' Attorney General Mitchell's affidavit acknowledged
overhearing of the defendant Plamondon's conversa-
tions. It stated that the Attorney General approved the
wiretaps "to gather intelligence deemed necessary to
protect the nation from attempts of domestic organiza-
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sealed exhibit of the surveillance logs for in camera
inspection by the trial court. On the basis of the
affidavit and the sealed exhibit, the government
claimed that the surveillances were lawful, even
though conducted without prior judicial approval,
as a reasonable exercise of the President's consti-
tutional power to protect the national security.' °
The government claimed that the power to order
surveillance without judicial approval was in-
ferred from the constitutional power and affirmed
by Congress in §2511(3) of Title I." That section
provides that nothing in Title M limits the Presi-
dent's constitutional power to protect against
the overthrow of the government or against "any
other clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the Government." The district
court, however, held that the surveillance violated
the fourth amendment, and on the basis of Alder-
man ordered the government to make full dis-
closure to Plamondon of the records of his inter-
cepted conversations.u2 The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed i3
Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme Court,14
rejected the government's contention that §2511(3)
constituted a congressional recognition of the
President's power to conduct domestic surveillance
without prior judicial approval. The Court held
that the plain meaning of the language of the
provision, as well as the legislative history, refuted
the government's interpretation of §2511(3).j6 The
tions to attack and subvert the existing structure of the
government." Id. at 300 n.2.
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, the
government did not contend that this affidavit was
sufficient under the warrant requirements of 18 U.S.C
§2518 (1968). Since a §2518 warrant was never applied
for by the government, the Court did not have to reach
the question whether the facts presented were adequate
to support issuance of a warrant.
10 407 U.S. at 301.
"The relevant language of 18 U.S.C. §2511(3)
(1968) provides:
Nor shall anything in this chapter be deem~ed to
limit the constitutional power of the President to
take such measures as he deems necessary to pro-
tect the United States against the overthrow of
the Government by force or other unlawful means,
or against any other clear and present danger to
the structure or existence of the Government.
12 United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D.
Mich. 1971).
"United States v. United States District Court, 444
F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971).
14 Justices Douglas Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and
Blackmun joined in ie majority opinion. Justice Doug-
las filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the result. Justice White filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment.
26 The legislative history relied upon by the Court
involves primarily a colloquy between Senators Hart,
opinion termed the language "essentially neutral"
with respect to the Presidential use of electronic
surveillance." In the Court's view, Congress in-
dicated by §2511(3) only that the Act should not
be interpreted to limit or disturb presidential
powers as they exist under the Constitution, and
§2511(3) is not a grant of new power to authorize
a wiretap without prior judicial approval even
in cases involving domestic security. 7
Having rejected the contention that §2511(3)
is a statutory grant of power to the President to
approve warrantless surveillance in domestic se-
curity cases, the Court then considered whether
this power could be derived from any of the Presi-
dent's constitutional powers. Taking note that
the President is empowered under article II to
"preserve and protect" the United States, 8 the
Court agreed that the President, in the discharge
of his duties, may find it necessary to approve
electronic surveillance. 9 The fourth amendment
does not deny the government the use of such sur-
veillance; however, it does prescribe a procedure
to be followed when these techniques are used.
Rejecting the government's argument that fourth
Holland, and McClellan on the Senate floor. It is quoted
at length in the opinion, 407 U.S. at 306-7, but it is
summarized in Senator Hart's statement:
[Nothing in Section 2511(3) even attempts to de-
fine the limits of the President's national security
power under present law.... [Section 2511(3)]
merely says that if the President has such a power,
then its exercise is in no way affected by Title IlI.
Id. at 307.
161d. at 303. See also Comment, The "National Se-
curity Wiretap": Presidential Prerogative or Judicial
Responsibility, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 888 (1972).
17 407 U.S. at 303.
"I U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §1 indicates that the primary
duty of the President is to 'preserve, protect, and de-
fend the Constitution of the United States." In District
Court, the government conceded that there is no express
grant in the Constitution of power to make searches
and seizures without regard to the fourth amendment.
However, before the court of appeals, the government
stressed the "inherent power" of the President to safe-
guard the security of the nation, and, impliedly, a power
to authorize warrantless wiretaps in cases where the
domestic security of the nation is threatened. The court
of appeals rejected that claim citing Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which,
while not involving electronic surveillance, stands for
the proposition that the President has no "inherent
power" to protect the domestic peace of the nation.
Furthermore, the history of the fourth amendment in-
dicates that the amendment was adopted specifically
to avoid abusive searches and seizures made under the
guise of inherent domestic power.
I Presidents and Attorneys General have employed
electronic surveillance techniques more or less continu-
ously since 1946. See United States v. United States
District Court, 444 F.2d at 669. The question of the
constitutionality of such use was before the Supreme
Court for the first time in District Court.
19721
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amendment protections ought to be suspended
in domestic surveillance situations, the Court held
that such protections are even more necessary
in such a situation, where the targets of the
surveillance are those suspected of unortho-
doxy in their political beliefs. 20 The very difficulty
of defining the "domestic security interest" in-
dicates a strong danger of abusive government
actions seeking to protect that interest. On bal-
ance, the government's duty to safeguard domestic
security is outweighed by the dangers to individual
privacY posed by unreasonable surveillance.
The basic issue presented in District Court is
whether the government's search was reasonable.21
"Reasonableness" derives its content and mean-
ing through reference to the warrant requirement
clause of the fourth amendment.n Inherent in the
concept of a warrant is its issuance by a neutral
and detached magistrate.P The Court in District
Court held that fourth amendment freedoms cannot
be properly guaranteed if domestic security sur-
veillance may be conducted solely at the discretion
of the executive branch.2 Executive officers are
charged with the duties of enforcing, investigating,
and prosecuting offenders. Therefore, they cannot
perform the function of neutral and detached
magistrates as envisioned by the fourth amend-
ment.
2 5
The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions
to the warrant requirement.2 6 The government,
20 While the Court did not rely upon first amendment
arguments to support its decision, the opinion did indi-
cate that first and fourth amendment values often
converge in domestic security situations. The Court
concluded:
The price of lawful dissent must not be a dread of
subjection to an unchecked surveillance power.
Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eaves-
dropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and dis-
cussion of Government action in private conversa-
tions. For private dissent, no less than open public
discourse is essential to our free society.
407 U.S. at 314.21 The Supreme Court has consistently held that
electronic surveillance and recordation by wiretap is
a search and seizure governed by the fourth amend-
ment. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
22 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-
484 (1971).
21 Id. at 473-84.
2'407 U.S. at 316-17.
25 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359-60
(1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).26See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966).
in District Court, argued that the special circum-
stances applicable to domestic security surveillance
necessitated recognition of a further exception.2
The special circumstances cited by the government
included the complex and subtle nature of the
probable cause determination in a domestic se-
curity situation,n the possibility of dangerous
security leaks as a result of diclosure of informa-
tion to a magistrate to secure a warrant,29 and
the fact that these searches functioned to gather
intelligence rather than evidence of a specific
However, none of these cases was a wiretap case. All
involved emergency situations which were held to pre-
vent obtaining a search warrant, or to excuse the ab-
sence of one. In all instances there was submission of
the evidence for subsequent judicial review. The
primary consideration in all cases was the need of law
enforcement officials to protect themselves or to prevent
evidence from being destroyed.
2 407 U.S. at 318. See also id. at 335 (White, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
Mr. Justice White would find an exception to the
general requirement of prior judicial approval in the
circumstances specified in §2511(3). He disagreed with
the construction given to that section by the majority,
and felt that §2511(3) should be read to mean that the
general ban against surveillance found in §2511(1)
would not apply if a court determined that in a specific
circumstance the President could constitutionally inter-
cept communications without a warrant. Id. at 336 n.2.
In the circumstances of this case, the Attorney Gen-
eral's affidavit fails to bring the search within the
exception of §2511(3). Justice White indicates:
[The affidavit] utterly fails to assume responsibil-
ity for the judgment that Congress demanded:
that the surveillance was necessary to prevent
overthrow by force or by other unlawful means
or that there was a clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the government. The affi-
davit speaks only of the attempts.., it articulates
no conclusion that the attempts involved any clear
and present danger ....
Id. at 341.
Justice White's construction of §2511(3) avoids the
constitutional issue and resolves the facts to a two-part
determination:
Clearly, for the Government to prevail it was
necessary to demonstrate first that the interception
involved was not subject to the statutory require-
ment of judicial approval for the wiretapping be-
cause the surveillance was within the scope of
§2511(3); and, secondly, if the Act did not forbid
the warrantless wiretap, that the surveillance was
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 339.
21 Justice Powell responded "if the threat is too
subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement
officers to convey its significance to a court, one may
question whether there is probable cause for surveil-
lance." Id. at 320.219 The Court argued in response that a warrant appli-
cation is not a public or adversary proceeding. If clerical
and secretarial personnel do pose security dangers,
those dangeri can be minimized "by proper adminis-
trative measures, possible to the point of allowing the
Government itself to provide the clerical assistance."
Id. at 321.
[Vol. 63
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crime3 0 The Court rejected the government argu-
ment that these circumstances justified a complete
exemption from judicial scrutiny. While recog-
nizing the constitutional derivation of the Presi-
dent's domestic security power, the Court none-
theless held that he must exercise that power in
a manner compatible with the fourth amendment.
The appropriate warrant procedures must be
followed."
The Court, however, left an opening for a con-
gressional response by indicating that the stand-
ards and procedures for warrant application set
out in §2518 of Title IHI4 are not necessarily ap-
plicable to domestic security surveillance cases.
The clear implication is that if Congress so pro-
vides, less precise standards for the issuance of
warrants than those of §2518 will be constitutional
in domestic security situations." But whatever
stafidards Congress may prescribe, United States
v. United States Distric Court clearly requires
prior judicial approval of all proposed surveillance.
In the absence of a warrant, even domestic security
surveillance approved by the President is unlawful.
The purpose of the Alderman requirement of
complete disclosure to a criminal defendant of
his illegally seized conversations is to allow him
the opportunity to suppress evidence derived from
such surveillance. In Gelbard v. United States,"
the second wiretap case decided this Term, this
3An attempt to justify a warrantless search by
distinguishing it from a search for evidence of a specific
crime was struck down in Camara v. San Francisco
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). There the Court
held that an individual's rights under the fourth amend-
ment exist apart from his being suspected of criminal
behavior. Id. at 528-30.
The facts in Camara involved health code inspec-
tions without prior warrant, and the distinction which
the government unsuccessfully attempted to draw was
one between civil as opposed to criminal actions. But
the Court indicated that-any distinction overlooks the
fundamental function of the warrant procedure which
is to interpose a neutral magistrate to decide whether
an invasion of privacy is constitutionally permissible.
Id. at 532-33.
3United States v. District Court, 407 U.S. at 320.
"See note 3 supra.
The Court carefully refrained from attempting to
detail precise standards for domestic security warrants.
However, the opinion suggests that Congress may
determine that the application and affidavit allege
circumstances other than those indicated in §2518,
which may be more appropriate in domestic security
cases. Congress could also provide for a specially desig-
nated court, e.g. the District Court or the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, to which a
request for a warrant could be made in sensitive situa-
tions. Congress could also provide that the time and
reporting requirements need not be as strict as those
of §2518.3 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
disclosure requirement was extended to the case
of a grand jury witness when his conversations
are intercepted by an illegal wiretap, and the
government seeks testimony based on information
derived from the illegal surveillance. At issue was
the evidentiary prohibition section of Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.
Section 2515 directs that the contents of any
conversation intercepted by an illegal wiretap may
not be received in evidence in a trial or other spe-
cifically indicated proceedings, including grand
jury hearings.3 5 justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, 6 held that where a grand jury witness
is held in civil contempt for refusing without just
cause to comply with the order of the court to
testify," the witness may invoke §2515 as a de-
fense, claiming that the interrogation will be based
upon the illegal interception of his own conversa-
tions." A finding by the trial court that the ques-
tions asked would be based upon information
illegally intercepted would constitute "just cause"
sufficient to preclude a finding of contempt.3 9
The holding in Gelbard expressly indicates that
where a potential witness invokes a §2515 defense,
the government must respond, admitting or deny-
3518 U.S.C. §2515 (1968) provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has
been intercepted, no part of the contents of such
communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States... if the disclosure of that informa-
tion would be in violation of this chapter.
The disclosure violation sections of Title III are
§2511 (1) which provides for a penalty of up to five
years' imprisonment or a $10,000 fine, or both, for
disclosure of the contents of a conversation inter-
cepted contrary to the procedures of Title III, and
§2517(3) which provides that the contents of an inter-
cepted conversation may be disclosed if the intercep-
tion was in accordance with the procedures of that
chapter.
35Justices Douglas, Stewart, White, and Marshalljoined in the opinion. Justices Douglas and White
filed concurring opinions.
'28 U.S.C. §1826 (a) (1970) codified the existing
practice in federal courts with respect to civil contempt
adjudications against grand jury witnesses. See also
Shiliitani v. United States, 394 U.S. 364 (1966).
"The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has inter-
preted Gelbard as retaining the constitutional rule of
Alderman that only the person whose privacy is invaded
by an illegal electronic surveillance has standing to
object. A grand jury witness cannot invoke a §2515
defense on the basis of an illegal interception of some-
one else's conversations. In re Womack, 466 F.2d 555
(7th Cir. 1972).
9 408 U.S. at 51-52.
1972]
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ing the use of electronic surveillance!0° If the gov-
ern'-"nt admits the use of surveillance, the district
court must establish its legality in terms of com-
pliance with §2518 procedures.!' If the surveillance
is determined to be illegal, then, under Alderman,
the government must turn over to the witness
all surveillance records of his intercepted conversa-
tions. The witness then has the opportunity to
argue before the district court that the testimony
sought before the grand jury is tainted because
it is the fruit of the illegal surveillance. Section
2515 prohibits disclosure of the illegal fruit to
the grand jury and provides the witness with a
just cause defense to a contempt charge.
In both Gelbard and its companion case, United
States v. Egan,42 the witnesses appeared but de-
clined to answer questions before the grand jury.
In Gelbard, the government admitted the sur-
veillance and the fact that the questions to be
asked before the grand jury were derived from
it. However, a federal judge had approved the
surveillance!' In Egan, the government did not
respond before the district court to the charge
of illegal surveillance. Subsequently, before the
Supreme Court, the government denied any over-
hearing of conversations of these respondents.4
The majority opinion in Gelbard severely limited
the scope of the question before the Court. In both
the Gelbard and the Egan situations, the majority
considered it necessary to assume that the govern-
ment had conducted illegal surveillance, and that
the testimony sought would be evidence derived
from that surveillance and, if disclosed to the
grand jury, would violate §2515. Thus the Court
proceeded on the premise that §2515 prohibited
the presentation to grand juries of the compelled
testimony of these witnesses," and limited the
question before the Court to whether the witness
himself could invoke the Title III prohibition
by raising a §2515 defense to a contempt charge.
Having so limited the question, the majority
"0 See discussion of 18 U.S.C. §3504 (1970) infra, in
text accompanying and following note 51.
11 See nOLC 3 .wpra.
42450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971).
43 Gelbard v. United States, 443 F.2d 837, 838 (9th
Cir 1971). Gelbard and petitioner Pamas were called
aclore a Los vigeles grand jury investigating possible
violations of the federal gambling laws.
41450 F.2d at 201-02. Respondents Egan and
Walsh were called before a federal grand jury at
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The investigation involved,
among other crimes, the alleged plot to kidnap a
government official.
4' 408 U.S. at 61 n.23.
46 Id. at 47.
found abundant support for the availability of a
§2515 defense in the legislative history of Title
III. They termed the language of §2515 an "un-
equivocal" expression of congressional policy to
strictly limit the use of electronic surveillance.
The protection of privacy was interpreted to be
the overriding congressional concern.41 Accord-
ingly, §2515 was found to be of central importance
in Title III as a means of enforcing that policy.
To allow a grand jury to hear testimony prohibited
by §2515 would subvert this legislative scheme
and destroy the integrity of the court by making
it a partner to the illegal conduct.!' Denial of the
§2515 defense subjects the victim to a second
federal invasion of privacy by "adding to the
injury of the interception, the insult of compelled
disclosure" to the grand jury.49 However, recogni-
tion of §2515 as a defense relieves the court of
the "anomalous duty" of finding the witness in
contempt for failing to cooperate with the prose-
cutor in an illegal course of action. 50
The majority found further support for a §2515
defense to a charge of contempt in 18 U.S.C. §3504
(1970). 51 That section establishes procedures to
be followed "upon a claim by a party aggrieved
that evidence is inadmissible because" of illegal
wiretapping or electronic surveillance. Under
§3504(a)(2), if the unlawful surveillance took
place before June 19, 1968, the effective date of
Title III, a full Alderman disclosure is not re-
17 Id. at 48.
18 Id. at 51.
49 Id. at 51-52. The Court rejected the government
contention that the invasion of privacy was over and
done with. Disclosure through compelled testimony
makes the witness a victim of a second federal crime.
"0 Recognition of §2515 as a defense to the contempt
charge "relieves judges of the anomalous duty of find-
ing a person in civil contempt for failing to cooperate
with the prosecutor in a course of conduct, which if
pursued unchecked, could subject the prosecutor him-
self to heavy civil and criminal penalities." In re Egan,
450 F.2d 199, 220 (3d Cir. 1971).
5" The relevant language of §3504 (1) provides:
[Ulpon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence
is inadmissible because it is the primary product
of an unlawful act or because it was obtained by
the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent
of the claim shall affirm or deny the occurrence of
the alleged act.
Section 3504 (2) provides that for unlawful acts
prior to June 19, 1968, disclosure shall not be required
unless such information may be "relevant to a pending
claim of... inadmissibility."
Section 3504(3) provides that no claim of inadmissi-
bility shall be considered if the event in question oc-
curred more than five years after the unlawful act.
"Unlawful act" as used in §3504 means "the use of
any electronic, mechanical, or other device in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States."
[Vol. 63
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quired; only information found to be relevant
after an in camera inspection of the surveillance
records need be disclosed to the party aggrieved.
However, for unlawful interceptions taking place
-after June 19, 1968, a full Alderman disclosure of
all records of the victim's own conversations is
required. Under §3504(a)(3), there is a five-year
limitation upon consideration of a claim of inad-
missibility based upon an unlawful act that took
place before June 19, 1968.
The June date does not appear in §3504(a)(1)
which directs that upon any claim of inadmissi-
bility, the opponent of the claim must affirm or
deny the alleged surveillance. The majority in
Gebard inferred from this omission of the date
that the procedures of §3504(a) (1) must be applied
to all claims without regard to the date of the
surveillance. Section 3504 specifically includes
application to a grand jury hearing. The Court
interpreted "party aggrieved" to include a grand
jury witness, and "evidence" to mean the witness's
testimony s The "opponent of the claim," in this
case the government, must affirm or deny the
use of electronic surveillance. Only after it is
determined by the trial court that an illegal sur-
veillance took place, does June 19, 1968, become
relevant in determining whether full disclosure
or a prior in camera examination is required.
Some level of disclosure to the victim of the sur-
veillance is required in any event. The Gelhard
majority took this requirement as implicit recogni-
tion of the victim's right to use the disclosed infor-
mation as the basis of a §2515 defense to a con-
tempt charge. 5' The §2515 defense is the witness's
procedural opportunity to press his §3504 claim
of inadmissibility.
The opinion turned finally to the government
argument that §2518(10)(a)55 of Title MI codifies
the procedure to suppress illegally seized evidence,
and that that section is applicable only to specified
types of proceedings, not including grand jury
proceedings. The Court refused to grant special
M 408 U.S. at 54. A party aggrieved in a grand jury
proceeding can only be the witness since there are no
other "parties" to such a hearing. Similarly, the evi-
dence presented to the grand jury is the testimony of
the witnesses.
u Id. at 58.
"Id. at 52-53.
55 18 U.S.C. §2518(10)(a) (1968) provides:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing or pro-
ceeding before any court, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the
United States... may move to suppress the con-
tents of any intercepted wire or oral communica-
tion, or evidence derived therefrom.
significance to the omission of "grand jury" from
the specified Iist.16 The Court indicated that grand
jury witnesses do not, as a rule, move for "sup-
pression" of their own testimony. Usually a witness
refuses to answer and receives a contempt hearing.
Thus the majority held that the omission of grand
jury proceedings from §2518(10)(a) does not pre-
clude a witness's right to a suppression hearing,
but instead implies that his opportunity arises
with a §2515 defense in a contempt proceeding.
The majority opinion in Gelbard clearly relies
on statutory construction of §2515, §3504(a)(1),
and §2518(10)(a), and does not reach the broader
constitutional issue of a grand jury witness's right
to object to testimony which is the fruit of any
violation of his fourth amendment rights. Justice
Douglas, however, in his concurring opinion,67
argues that the fourth amendment itself shields
a grand jury witness from any question, or any
subpoena based on information derived from
searches and seizures which invade the witness's
fourth amendment rights.-s  Further, Justice
Douglas asserts that Title III is unconstitutional
because any government use of electronic sur-
veillance violates the fourth amendment.59 He
concludes that the essence of a provision forbidding
the acquisition of evidence by illegal surveillance
is that the evidence shall never be used.'0 However,
in both the majority and dissenting opinions,
the Court recognized a government right to em-
ploy electronic surveillance if proper procedures
are followed because the government has the right
to use the most efficient and effective techniques
available in proper pursuance of its duties. Thus
there is little concurrence on the present Court
56 408 U.S. at 59 n.19.
'
T Id. at 62.
r"Id.
59 Id.
60 justice Douglas found the Gdbard result con-
trolled by Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1919). In that case, federal agents un-
lawfully seized documents belonging to the petitioners
and their company. The documents were returned at
the order of the court, but in the interim the agents
had copied them. After return of the originals, the
prosecutor attempted to regain possession of them by
issuing a grand jury subpoena duces lecum. The Silver-
thomes refused to comply with the subpoena and were
convicted of contempt. The Supreme Court reversed,
Justice Holmes holding that the documents unlawfully
seized could not be used in court, and could not be used
at all.
In Gebard, the government distinguished Silver-
thorne as not dealing with electronic surveillance. The
majority opinion in Gdbard dealt entirely with statutory
construction and did not reach the fourth amendment
issues, and so never considered Silverthorne.
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in Justice Douglas' position that the fourth amend-
ment completely forbids all electronic surveillance.
A strong dissenting opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for four members of the Court,'
found the majority result supportable by the
statutory language, but not compelled by it.
2
The two opinions differ primarily in the interpre-
tation given to the legislative history of §2515
and §3504, and the weight given to the historical
method of operation of the grand jury.
The normal grand jury procedure, codified by
28 U.S.C. §1826 (1970), deals mostly with ques-
tions of privilege against self-incrimination. A
witness is entitled to a hearing before a finding of
contempt, but it is an expedited hearing consisting
primarily of arguments by the attorneys on the
agreed-upon facts.n A broad right to disclosure
of government records to the witness at this stage
of the proceedings has never before been indicated.
The dissent in Gelbard indicated that while Con-
gress could provide for this broad disclosure, it
had not done so in §2515. The opinion pointed
out the unique scope of inquiry open to the grand
jury, and contended that time-consuming chal-
lenges by witnesses to the admissibility of the
testimony sought are inimical to the grand jury's
function which is to sift all evidence that may
result in the presentation of criminal charges."
The dissent attached greater significance than
did the majority to the inclusion of grand jury
proceedings in §2515 and the corresponding omis-
sion in §2518(10)(a).1-, The latter -ection is the
codification of the right to disclosure of records
of illegal surveillance and of the right to a hearing
on suppression of the evidence derived from such
surveillance. 6  This is in essence a full Alderman
hearing, which has never before been accorded
to grand jury witnesses. According to the dissent,
grand jury witnesses denied the §2518(10)(a)
remedy were not, however, completely without
a remedy. Section 2515 is the basic prohibition
against disclosure. Remedies in addition to that
of §2518(10)(a) are criminal and civil sanctions
indicated in §25117 and §2520, 63 and the latter
two remedies are available to grand jury witnesses.
61 Justices Blackmun and Powell and Chief Justice
Burger joined in the dissent.
62408 U.S. at 71.
61 See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966);
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Blau v.
United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
6 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).65408 U.S. at 81.61 See note 55 supra.67See note 35 supra.
The dissent argued further that §3504(1), re-
quiring an opponent of a cLinm of inadmissibility
to admit or deny the use of electronic surveillance,
had no application to the facts of these cases. Only
Gelbard made what might be termed a "claim of
inadmissibility" within the language of the statute,
and in his case, the government admitted the sur-
veillance and indicated that prior approval had
been given by a federal judge. In the case of Egan,
the government entirely denied conducting sur-
veillance. Even assuming that §3504 applied in
these cases, the dissent read the June 19, 1968,
limitation as applying to all three sections of §3504.
Thus the entire statutory provision would apply
only to surveillances which took place before June
19, 1968, and would be inapplicable to both the
Gelbard and Egan cases.69
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in
Gelbard,70 may have indicated a way to reconcile
the majority policy, which calls for disclosure to
the victim of the surveillance of all records of his
conversations, with the dissent policy favoring
uninhibited and broad investigative powers in
the grand jury. Justice White concurs in the ma-
jority result, "at least where the United States
has intercepted communications without a warrant
in circumstances where court approval was re-
quired." 7' Therefore, where the trial court deter-
mines that illegal surveillance did take place, a
grand jury witness should have the right to ex-
amine all surveillance records of his own conversa-
tions with a view toward showing taint in the
testimony requested before the grand jury, and,
if necessary, showing a §2515 "just cause" defense
to a contempt charge. The policy of Title III,
supported by the Supreme Court in United States v.
United States District Court, clearly favors prior
judicial approval of all electronic surveillance.
If the executive officers of the government adhere
to that policy, there will be few cases of warrant-
less surveillance. In those few instances where
warrantless surveillance occurs, a full Alderman
hearing could reasonably be granted to grand
jury witnesses without unduly delaying or dis-
turbing the activities of the grand jury.
However, in justice White's view, a different
result could occur where the government produces
68 Section 2520 provides for actual and punitive civil
damages in a suit brought by the victim of an unlawful
surveillance. Good faith reliance upon a court order
warranting the surveillance is a comDiete defense.
9 408 U.S. at 86-88.
70 Id. at 69.
71 Id. at 70.
[Vol. 63
